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MARKET GATEKEEPERS: THEIR IMPACT ON PROPERTY VALUES 
FOLLOWING FLOODING IN LIBERTY COUNTY, TEXAS 
Introduction 
Burrell E. Montz, Binghamton University 
Graham A. Tobin, University of Minnesota, Duluth 
In December and January 1991/92, sixteen subdivisions along the Trinity River in 
Liberty County, Texas were flooded. This was the fourth flood in three years and 
affected more than 270 residences. While many of the houses were elevated above 
the flood level, the disruption caused by flooding was both widespread and long-
lasting. When the County was visited in January, approximately three weeks after 
initial flooding, some of the subdivisions were accessible only by boat, and the extent 
of damage had not been fully assessed. 
The Trinity Valley is an area of frequent flooding (see Table 1), and these particular 
subdivisions have been flooded four times during the last three years. The flooding is 
linked, in part, to operation of Lake Livingston Dam that stores water for the City of 
Houston. The data in Table 2 detail characteristics regarding capacity and operation 
of Lake Livingston Dam. Flooding is particularly severe when large water releases are 
required to preserve the integrity of the dam. Typically, management of such facilities 
is predicated on one of two strategies: release of water in anticipation of extreme 
precipitation levels or release of water during and following such precipitation events. 
Since the former is dependent on th'e certainty of occurrence of needed precipitation, 
the latter management option has been used. Thus, flooding of low-lying areas is 
expected to recur. 
Given the frequency, magnitude, and duration of flooding (see Table 3), Liberty County 
provides a useful case study for analyzing the extent to which market gatekeepers 
(eg., realtors, insurance agents, and mortgage lenders) influence property values and 
sales. Thus, during our visit to the County, we toured several of the flooded 
subdivisions (two by car, one by boat) and spoke to realtors, appraisers, and residents, 
as well as the Emergency Management official. We subsequently developed and 
distributed a questionnaire to real estate companies, insurance brokers, and banks. 
This report presents our findings in two sections, the first dealing with the results of our 
visit and the second focusing on questionnaire results. 
Results from the Site Visit 
While in Liberty, in addition to touring several of the affected subdivisions, we spoke to 
the head of Emergency Services, local residents, realtors and appraisers. Field 
reconnaissance showed that those houses elevated on stilts suffered little or no 
damage to structures or contents while houses remaining at ground level or those 
raised only minimally suffered to a great extent. Nonetheless, disruption to the 
community and to the regional economy was considerable, as many residents were 
relocated in shelters, motels, and with friends for the duration of the flood. Certainly 
this continual disruption is expected to playa major role in devaluing properties. 
There was a wide range of property types found in the floodplain, with expensive 
houses interspersed with very poor quality structures. In addition, some housing 
consists of second homes (weekend retreats) built to take advantage of the riverfront 
or the lakefront locations that dot the floodplain. As a result, disruption, though 
significant for some, is not an issue for other owners of what is locally termed the "river 
bottom." 
Attitudes of local residents toward the flooding and its impact on property values 
varied. However, all residents we talked to expected to experience more flooding in 
the future. One resident, who fully expected to see a decrease in property values, 
suggested that it was possible to blame two floods on someone else, but by the time a 
third one came, he had to begin looking at why he, or anyone else, would live in such 
an area. 
Because of the timing of our visit (around a weekend), it was difficult to contact many 
gatekeepers. However, we were able to develop at least anecdotal evidence of 
attitudes toward flooding. It is clear from the evidence collected that average house 
values both within and between subdivisions varied considerably from a few inhabited 
predominantly by higher income groups and others predominantly by lower income 
groups. Changes have occurred over time as well. For example, one subdivision (Old 
Snake River) was originally developed as weekend homes. However, once Lake 
Livingston was built, those who could afford property on the "big" lake moved there, 
and the housing in Old Snake River Subdivision filtered down in value. Thus, some of 
the changes are clearly not related to the flood problem, although flooding may have 
influenced decisions to move. 
According to our sources, realtors are generally reluctant to list houses in the flooded 
subdivisions. These properties were thought to be too much trouble for the effort 
involved. Our sources also reported that houses in the subdivisions are estimated at 
50% lower in value than comparable non-flooded property. In addition, some realtors 
have the perception that residents believe their houses to be worth 50-70% more than 
they actually are. However, the agents stated that these are people who "like that kind 
of living." 
When asked about relocation as a possible adjustment to frequent flooding, a realtor 
responded quite negatively. He suggested that residents would benefit considerably 
because FEMA would have to purchase alternative property well above the current 
value of their homes. Consequently flooded residents would be trading low value 
dwellings for upmarket property because housing in non-flood areas is not available at 
the same price. 
Questionnaire Results 
A total of thirty-nine questionnaires was distributed, with seventeen going to real estate 
firms, seventeen to insurance companies and five to banks. All companies and banks 
listed in the Liberty County telephone book were included. Response results vary 
significantly, with four out of five banks responding and seven out of seventeen (41 %) 
insurance brokers responding. Unfortunately only two usable questionnaires were 
received from realtors, so they are not included in the analysis. In fact, information 
gleaned from these two questionnaires was no different than the information we 
obtained during our visit to Liberty County. 
Mortgage Lenders. All of the banks grant mortgages on floodprone properties, though 
these properties account for less than 10% of mortgages granted. In addition, all take 
a property's location relative to the River into account in their lending decisions. 
Nonetheless, the banks do not limit the size of loans, based on location in the 
floodplain. 
All of the mortgage lenders who responded believe that floodplain properties are 
lower in value than houses outside the floodplain. Three out of four attributed this 
difference solely to the flood hazard. On the other hand, these bankers do not believe 
that the depreCiating effect of flooding extends beyond the immediate hazard area, 
such that nonfloodplain properties are affected by the local disamenity. 
It appears, then, that mortgage lenders recognize value differences between 
floodprone and nonfloodprone properties. While this does not mean they will not 
invest in floodprone properties through mortgage loans, it does suggest that the level 
of investment will be low. That 75% of the bankers attribute the differences solely to 
flooding suggests that the flood risk depreciates values, irrespective of other 
contributing factors. 
Insurance Agents. Of the seven insurance companies responding to our 
questionnaire, six reported that they sell flood insurance. These agents estimate that 
they sell between 10 and 30 flood insurance policies per year, with one noting that he 
had sold only three policies up until the 1991/92 floods. At that time he sold more than 
40. 
All agents report an increase in the number of people asking about flood insurance in 
the past three years, and all say this comes from people living in flooded areas. 
However, one suggested that 10% of the increase came from outside the flooded 
areas. 
The agents were asked to estimate the costs of policies as well as the amounts of 
coverage that are common. The results are presented in Table 4. There is wide 
variation in both costs and coverage; however an average policy costs approximately 
$260 per year. The wide range in coverage on structures (from a high of $185,000 to a 
low of $7,000) and on contents (with a high of $75,000 and a low of $2,000) speaks to 
the variety of housing types and values in the floodprone subdivisions. 
The agents differ somewhat on the number of policy holders making flood insurance 
claims. One reported only three claims out of ten policies in 1991, while others spoke 
of 80%. It appears, however, that virtually 100% of all flood insurance policy holders 
have made claims since 1988. The agents also provided somewhat different 
estimates of the number of floodprone properties that are insured. Two out of six 
reported that 25-50% of the houses in flooded subdivisions are insured, while three 
estimate an adoption rate of 10-25%. One agent suggested that less than 10% have 
purchased it. 
Perhaps even more illustrative of these agents' views of floodprone lands are their 
comments about flood insurance. While certainly not scientifically nor statistically 
sound, the comments suggest a similar attitude as that of realtors to the people who 
live in the subdivisions along the Trinity River. As an example, one insurance agent 
wrote: "People move into the river bottoms so they can apply for aid after the next 
flood." A similar statement is "Most people in flood areas do not purchase flood 
insurance because they know they will get some assistance from the government." 
This, however, is contrary to Federal regulations which require that post-flood disaster 
assistance be withheld for homeowners in the 1 OO-year floodplain without flood 
insurance. Finally, several insurance agents suggested that residents seek flood 
insurance just "".before the River rises." 
Summary and Conclusions 
The results of our research, both on-site and from questionnaires, indicate that all 
three groups of "gatekeepers" view the floodprone subdivisions as lower-valued 
properties. While mortgage lenders did not exhibit a reluctance to handle these 
properties, realtors certainly did. The fact that some real estate agents admitted 
avoiding handling these properties speaks to the value agents put on them. Further, 
insurance agents seem to be cynical about floodplain residents' motives for insuring 
their houses against flooding. 
It is clear that houses in the subdivisions along the Trinity River are, for the most part, 
of lower value than nonfloodprone houses. Whether the market gatekeepers we 
studied had a role in the development of this difference, or whether they are merely 
reflecting the difference, is not entirely clear. However, there is a distinction, both 
economically and socially, between floodprone and nonfloodprone properties in 
Liberty County, and both public and private actions have served to perpetuate that 
distinction. 
This research addresses private actions, as seen in the actions and attitudes of real 
estate agents, insurance agents, and mortgage lenders. What needs to be evaluated 
now is the role of public actions, particularly the decision to elevate 200+ houses 
rather than relocate .the residents. While this certainly minimizes property damage 
from flooding, it does nothing to minimize disruption caused by three weeks of high 
water. This is the direction of the next phase of our research on Liberty County. 
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16,600 (miles)2 
STORAGE AND DISCHARGE MAY 23rd 1990: 
LIBERTY 
DAM 
DAM STORAGE 
107,000 (cfs) 
103,600 (cfs) 
1.8~ (acre feet) 
DAM STORAGE (max) 2.1~ (acre feet) 
DAM (MAR 30th) 1.9~ (acre feet) 
.' 
Table 3 
SEASONALITY OF FLOODING IN LIBERTY, TEXAS 
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DURATION OF FLOODING .IN LiBERTY, TEXAS (1991-92) 
DEC 27th 28.25 (ft) 
JAN 1st 29.70 (ft) 
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Policy Costs 
AY.!J Min 1m 
275 
250 
250 
350 
300 
150 
375 
400 
350 
600 
600 
125 
115 
110 
150 
75 
Table 4 
Insurance Costs and Coverage Levels 
Structure Coverage 
AY.!J Min ~ 
50,000 
60,000 
40,000 
20,000 
15,000 
50,000 
125,000 10,000 
90,000 7,000 
185,000 7,000 
80,000 11,000 
140,000 7,000 
175,000 30,000 
Contents Coverage 
AY.!J Min 1m 
10,000 
30,000 
25,000 
10,000 
5,000 
12,000 
75,000 2,000 
30,000 4,500 
60,000 4,000 
35,000 4,500 
45,000 3,000 
50,000 2,000 
